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Abstract  
This study explores success rates in obtaining angel financing based on the gender 
composition of entrepreneurial teams using data from the television program Shark Tank. 
Consistent with prior work, we find that women-owned teams receive lower company valuations 
and less capital to finance their new ventures relative to their male counterparts. However, we 
find that the likelihood of a team receiving an offer from an angel investor is independent of the 
entrepreneurs’ gender. We discover women-owned firms initially value their companies at 
significantly lower amounts than teams consisting of all males. Thus, angel investors provide 
lower final company valuations to women-owned firms because women, on average, ask for less. 
These results hold when controlling for important entrepreneur and firm characteristics that may 
strongly impact the angel financing outcome, such as the size of the entrepreneurial team, 
company age and prior success of the firm. We also find that the negative effect of a women-
owned firm on the amount of financing received is highly dependent upon the industry the 
entrepreneurs choose to enter. 
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1 Introduction 
Women remain substantially underrepresented among entrepreneurs, yet women-owned 
businesses2 represent the fastest growing sector of new venture ownership in the United States 
(“U.S.”) (Becker-Blease & Sohl, 2007). According to data from the U.S. Census Bureau, from 
1997 to 2012, women-owned firms grew at a rate of 2.5 times the national average; in the same 
time period, the number of business in the U.S. grew by 33%, while U.S. women-owned firms 
increased by 82%, as shown in Table 1 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1997-2012). Further, revenue and 
employment growth among women-owned firms outperformed that of all other firms, aside from 
large publically traded corporations (Coleman & Robb, 2009). Even though women-owned firms 
are engines of economic growth, fewer women start companies each year. According to the 2015 
Kauffman Index of Start-up Activity, in 1996, the rate of new male entrepreneurs3 who founded 
a company was 4.56% for the year, while the rate of new female entrepreneurs was 3.12%. 
However, that rate further declined in 2014, standing at 2.64% for the rate of new female 
entrepreneurs, as opposed to 4.92% for the rate of new male entrepreneurs (Fairlie, Morelix, 
Reedy, & Russell, 2015). Additionally, out of the total new U.S. entrepreneurial population in 
1996, 56% were males and 44% were females, while in 2014, the population consisted of 63% 
males and 37% females. Therefore, in the 18-year span, the rate of new female entrepreneurs 
who started companies decreased, while the new male entrepreneurial population increased, thus 
making the space even more male-dominated. 
Insert Table 1 here 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 A firm is considered to be “women-owned” or “female-owned” if women own 51 percent or more of the equity, 
interest, or stock of the business.  
3 Rate of new entrepreneurs measures the percentage of the adult, non-business-owner population that starts a 
business 
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The underrepresentation of female entrepreneurs and decrease in female start-up activity 
may be caused by a lack of financing. External financing from investors is crucial for the 
survival and growth in the early stages of a company (Amit, Glosten, & Muller, 1990; Berger & 
Udell, 1998). An especially important funding source for early-stage companies is angel 
financing because angel investors are more likely to invest in the risky stages of company 
development than are venture capital funds (Preston, 2004). Angel investors are generally high 
net worth individuals who invest in small, private firms on their own account (Wong, Bhatia, & 
Freeman, 2009). Over the last 30 years, the level of investments made by angels has been double 
that of investments made by venture capitalists (Preston, 2004). Yet, prior literature suggests that 
women obtain significantly less capital to finance their new businesses (Alsos, Isaksen, & 
Ljunggren, 2006).  
This study seeks to understand the determinants of success in angel financing by female 
entrepreneurial ventures and disentangle whether gender matters separate from other 
characteristics that determine investment desirability. The unique hand-collected dataset allows 
for us to examine specific entrepreneur and firm characteristics in order to further isolate the 
underlying cause for the funding differences between teams. Thus, this allows us to get towards 
the gender bias. The main question underlying this investigation is: are women less likely to 
secure angel financing simply because of their gender alone? If women choose industries that 
may be of lower growth, or women-owned ventures are less successful prior to seeking funding, 
then the net present value (“NPV”) of these firms should be lower, outside of any consideration 
of gender. This could make it harder to obtain financing. However, if women-owned ventures 
receive less funding in high growth industries with substantial prior company success, this would 
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suggest a market imperfection such that positive NPV ventures are not funded merely because of 
a gender bias in investment.  
Understanding the reasons behind differences in funding for male- and female-led 
companies has numerous implications for both entrepreneurs and policy. For entrepreneurs, it 
helps inform female start-ups how to better access vital funding for their new ventures. Further, 
it is crucial to understand whether an entrepreneur’s gender may impact funding decisions for 
reasons outside of the potential success of the company. From a policy standpoint, addressing the 
central question as to whether gender bias exists in angel financing can inform governments the 
steps needed to take in order to remedy such issues. Female-owned firms make significant 
contributions to creating and maintaining a healthy and nimble national economy (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 2010). They have grown in number and size over the past two 
decades, but are still far away from achieving parity with male-owned firms. Our results provide 
support for the importance of such government programs that can work to minimize the funding 
gap between all-female and all-male entrepreneurial ventures. The disparity in company 
valuations for all-female and all-male teams can also be dependent upon the industry the 
entrepreneurs choose to enter. Females may cluster in certain industries that may be of lower 
growth as this is where they believe they will have the highest chance of receiving funding. 
Thus, one potential governmental method to stimulate the financing of women-owned, and also 
women-owned firms in certain industries, is to provide tax incentives for companies that fund 
women-owned firms and firms in those industries. For instance, the government can provide 
either benchmark requirements for investors on the number of women-owned companies they 
need to fund, or the total magnitude of capital given to fund new female ventures. 
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In this paper, we compare several measures of angel financing success based the gender 
composition of teams to understand why women-owned firms face funding difficulties. We use 
data collected from the television program Shark Tank, which provides many advantages. First, 
to the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first studies to examine companies that were both 
successful in securing angel financing and those that were not. Second, we take into 
consideration the entrepreneurs’ initial company valuations (“initial company valuation”) they 
come in requesting from investors, alongside the final company valuations (“final company 
valuation”) they receive from the angel investors. We find that women are no less likely than 
men to obtain angel financing, yet the amount of capital female entrepreneurs obtain is 
significantly less than that of men. However, we find that the disparity in capital obtained is not 
due to differences in characteristics that can impact funding success, such as total company sales, 
total number of entrepreneurs on the team, company age, or personal capital invested into the 
business. But rather, our findings show that industry is important in understanding the company 
valuation differences based on gender. Dependent upon industry, women-owned firms receive 
lower final company valuations. Further, all-female teams, on average, ask for half the dollar 
amount than that of all-male teams and are willing to give up larger equity stakes in the 
company. Thus, women receive less capital; however, it is because they value their company at 
lower amounts, all else equal. Similar to the traditional angel financing route, firms present 
initial company valuations to investors, and our findings show that women-owned firms 
consistently undervalue themselves relative to their male counterparts. Therefore, limitations to 
angel financing are self-imposed. 
Given the structure of our analysis and data collection, we are able to observe not only 
the final funding received, but also the potential failures and negotiation processes. The ability to 
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view and incorporate these failures into analyses is very rarely used in prior literature. The 
former alleviates selection bias, while the latter allows us to include more nuanced metrics of 
success, such as the total number of offers a team received throughout the entire process. Prior 
studies have only had access to the final offer accepted by the entrepreneurs and were unable to 
track the number of different offers received by the team. Further, these interactions allow us to 
gather demographic, financial and commonality information in order to examine the antecedents 
of angel funding including gender, industry and negotiation processes. 
2 Literature Review 
This paper helps to understand fundamental gender differences in angel financing success 
rates by determining the underlying causes to the gaps in securing funding. Previous work has 
looked into the relationships between financing and gender, but has largely examined them in the 
context of bank loans (Buttner & Rosen, 1989, 1992; Coleman, 2000; Fay & Williams, 1993), 
and venture capital (Brush, Carter, Gatewood, Greene, & Hart, 2004; Greene, Brush, Hart, & 
Saparito, 2001). Brush, Carter, Gatewood, Greene, and Hart (2004) found that women have 
received a disproportionately low share of available venture capital in the U.S., and linked this to 
the fact that the majority of venture capitalists and important decision makers in venture capital 
firms are males. Yet, little work examines angel financing for women, even though this source of 
financing has been a crucial part of the success for female-lead start-ups relative to other sources 
such as venture capital (Gundry & Welsch, 2001).  
While closest in spirit to (Becker-Blease & Sohl, 2007), data limitations prevent them 
from analyzing individual angel investing deals. Becker-Blease and Sohl (2007) use survey data 
to evaluate the proportion of total angel investment deals that go to women and the frequency 
with which the females seeking angel funding. However, without any specific knowledge of the 
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characteristics of the individual financing deals, the determinants of deal success and size outside 
of gender, such as the initial success of the company, industry, or other control variables, cannot 
be understood. These variables are necessary to determine whether gender differences in funding 
stem from firm-level traits that determine value, or the gender of entrepreneurs alone. Thus, prior 
work determines patterns in angel financing, but not its antecedents. Other work examining the 
relationship between gender and the success of angel funding do not include failed pitches, and 
only examine those companies that were successfully funded (Coleman & Robb, 2009; Fairlie & 
Robb, 2009). Further, past studies do not have access to the variables we provide that we believe 
may strongly impact the financing decision, such as previous success measures of the firm or the 
size of entrepreneurial teams (Brooks, Huang, Kearney, & Murray, 2014). 
Additionally, past research does not consider differences in valuation, even though all 
entrepreneurs present their initial company valuations, comprised of an asking dollar amount and 
equity stake, to the angel investors. The prior datasets are limited to only analyzing final 
company valuations based on the funding entrepreneurs received, but do not consider the initial 
company valuations the entrepreneurs presented to the angel investors. This suggests that female 
entrepreneurs may not be less successful in obtaining funding, but rather may undervalue their 
companies relative to male counterparts. Given that the amount of funding new ventures receive 
will determine the capital adequacy of those ventures, and not only the likelihood of receiving 
funding, understanding gender differences in valuation as well will provide insight into the 
phenomenon that female-lead entrepreneurial ventures are underrepresented. 
3 Setting and Data 
We explore the relationship between gender and angel investment using hand-collected 
data from the television program Shark Tank. Beginning in 2009, this program features a panel 
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of five angel investors who consider pitches from entrepreneurs (either alone or in a team) 
seeking financing. Every episode of the show consists of four separate pitches4 by different 
entrepreneurs. The structure of each pitch is as follows: the entrepreneur(s) present information 
regarding their company and investment goal, including the dollar value sought and equity stake 
offered. A question and answer period follows, during which the potential investors ask 
questions related to the company, product, entrepreneur(s), etc. This may include information 
covering the entrepreneur’s work history, age of the company, amount of personal capital 
invested into the business, intellectual property rights, prior sales of the company, product 
production costs and selling prices. Finally, the investors may make offers and negotiate with the 
entrepreneurs over the equity stake5, and a deal between the entrepreneur(s) and one or more 
angel investors may result.6  
Altogether, the discussions between the investors and entrepreneurs reveal a great deal 
about each company. Using master spreadsheets, over 110 variables were collected from the 
video recordings of each pitch. All inputs for each variable were double keyed by two separate 
research assistants. The two datasets were then compared against one another to highlight any 
discrepancies. Following the identification of discrepancies, a third party reconciled all of the 
coding inconsistencies to improve data accuracy and minimize potential for human error. We 
then compiled a finalized, cleaned dataset after the three rounds of data collection. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Eight episodes in Season 1 consisted of five separate pitches, as opposed to the standard four pitches. 
5 The show operates under one main rule regarding the investment: entrepreneur(s) must obtain at least the dollar 
value offered in order to obtain a deal. From one perspective, this is a drawback as it may not be reflective of 
traditional angel investment, since entrepreneurs can negotiate down the dollar value asked and still receive 
investment. However, from a research perspective, this is advantageous as it essentially holds constant the dollar 
amount. This enables us to conclude that changes from asking valuation to accepted valuation are a function not of 
the absolute value of the dollar amount asked, but rather changes in equity. 
6 More details on the selection process for the television program can be found in Appendix A. 
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As we are interested in the relationship between gender and success in angel investment, 
several different measures of angel financing success were collected. Thus, we focus our analysis 
on the following variables. We first consider whether entrepreneurial teams received an offer at 
all, or the intensive margin. This variable, “offer”, is an indicator equal to one for those pitches 
that received at least one offer from the investors and zero for no offers. We are also interested in 
understanding the relationship between gender and final company valuations. Therefore, final 
company valuations were calculated for teams that accepted an offer. The final company 
valuations are the quotient of the accepted dollar amount and the accepted equity amount. Given 
the final company valuation, another metric we examined is the difference between accepted 
final company valuation with the investors and the initial company valuation the entrepreneur 
presented (“bid ask spread”). 
Additionally, we are also interested in the descriptive information and firm characteristics 
that may help determine success. These include information regarding the company or product 
such as the industry, age of the company, location, product production costs and selling prices. 
We also examine financial information including the total company sales to date, debt taken out, 
personal capital invested, the number of existing investors, etc. Finally, data on the various 
company valuations and received offers was collected. We studied the initial asking dollar and 
equity amounts presented by the entrepreneurs, along with the financial terms of any final offers 
that were accepted with the angel investors. We also tracked the number of total final offers the 
entrepreneurs received throughout the entire negotiation process, allowing for calculations of 
more nuanced metrics of success. 
Further, we are also concerned with various descriptive statistics on the team-level. We 
have several variables capturing the size and gender composition of each team (or the number of 
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females present). First, we examine the angel investing success for all-female teams. That is, 
pitches from a team composed entirely of women. This metric also includes pitches from one-
woman teams. Next, we examine teams with at least one woman, to capture the impact of a non-
zero female composition on the likelihood of receiving funding and the amount funded. A team 
with both male and female entrepreneurs is considered a “mixed” team. We also look into 
statistics with all-male teams. 
Next, we assess whether the Shark Tank investment process reflects that of the traditional 
process of securing angel financing. We find that the process on the show closely mirrors the 
process used by angel investors. Angel investors, similar to the investors on the show, are high 
net worth individuals (net worth of more than $1 million) who invest in small companies with 
their own capital (Wong, Bhatia, & Freeman, 2009). The angel investment process is a sequential 
one with five main stages: familiarization, screening, bargaining, managing and harvesting (Paul, 
Whittam, & Wyper, 2007). Each stage in the process works as follows and is largely consistent 
with how Shark Tank operates. 
During familiarization, investors learn details about the entrepreneur and partake in an 
initial meeting. The entrepreneur is required to present a business plan to allow investors to 
gather more information on the opportunity. Following the initial meeting, a two-step screening 
stage ensues. The first step is where angel investors complete due diligence on the company. The 
order of this step in the process differs slightly in Shark Tank, as all due diligence on the 
companies is performed after the investor and entrepreneur enter into a tentative agreement on-
air. The second step, however, is visible on Shark Tank as it is how the investor shows their 
commitment to the entrepreneur. The investors create an emotional attachment to the 
entrepreneur and company through brainstorming various ways in which they can positively 
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contribute to the company beyond the initial financial investment. After follows a bargaining 
stage during which both parties, the entrepreneur and investor, negotiate the capital deployment 
and equity terms of the investment. The last two stages of the angel investing process, managing 
and harvesting, are not seen on Shark Tank, but nonetheless happen after a tentative deal is 
entered. The managing stage is after the investment capital is deployed, when investors take on 
an active role in the business, and through the harvesting stage, the company continues to grow. 
Thus, the investment process followed on Shark Tank is largely representative of that of the 
typical angel financing process, although time spans of processes may differ. 
However, several key differences to angel investing on Shark Tank as opposed to a 
traditional setting are of note. First, angel investors typically do not influence one another, nor do 
they face direct competition for deals. On the show, however, it may be the case in which the 
angels begin to bid against one another and artificially skew the final company valuations 
upwards. Second, during the bargaining stage, entrepreneurs can, in fact, negotiate downward the 
dollar value of capital initially asked for in a real setting. Yet, on the show, the investor must 
match the dollar amount asked for by the entrepreneur in order to enter into a deal. Further, 
during the managing stage, the angels tend to restrict the number of business they invest in due to 
their hands-on approach, while investors on Shark Tank allow themselves to invest in more 
companies than the average angel investor. 
The investment processes, both in the traditional sense and on the show, also highlight 
the motivations of angel investors. Typical angel investing criteria focuses on four main 
premises: the passion of entrepreneur, trustworthiness of entrepreneur, quality of management 
team, and exit opportunities (Sudek, 2008). Other principles angel investors consider include: 
barrier to entry of competitors, intellectual property, growth potential, competition and return on 
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investment. The majority of these principles are evident in the angel investor’s investment 
decisions on the show. The investors quantify the entrepreneur’s passion through their capital 
investment, time allocation and concern for the coach-ability of the entrepreneur. Therefore, the 
angel investing process on the show is representative of the true angel financing process in all 
key respects. 
4 Summary Statistics  
As Table 2 indicates, our sample includes a total of 495 entrepreneurial pitches, the 
majority of which are by teams composed only of male entrepreneurs. Very few of the total 
number of pitches are from mixed teams; 60% of entrepreneurial pitches are from all-male 
teams, 26% from all-female teams, and 14% from mixed teams. All-female and all-male 
companies do not differ significantly in age, entrepreneurial team size, personal capital invested, 
production cost, selling price per unit or total prior company sales.  
Companies are categorized into industries based on the Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS) classifications. The GICS is an industry taxonomy developed in 1999 and has 
been shown to result in more effective firm groupings than other industry categorizations such as 
the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system (Bhojraj, Lee, & Oler, 2003). The GICS 
consists of 10 different industry sectors, ranging from consumer discretionary to information 
technology to utilities. However, companies may span across multiple industries. Thus, we 
allotted companies in multiple industries a unique industry code, modifying the initial ten GICS 
industry codes to include 28 variations. Figure 1 indicates the distribution of companies across 
all industries. Most firms are in consumer discretionary and consumer staples classifications; 
78% of all companies fall into these two categories. All-female teams come from a smaller range 
of industries than all-male teams; all-female teams fall into 12 out of the 28 categories, while all-
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male teams span across 27 classifications, as shown in figures 2 and 3 respectively. Consumer 
discretionary and consumer staples industry classifications constitute 87% of all-female teams. 
However, for all-male teams, the concentration in consumer discretionary and consumer staples 
is 72%. The third largest company classification for all-male teams is industrials with 4% of 
teams. The industry distribution for mixed teams more closely mirrors that of all-female teams, 
with companies falling into 10 out of the 28 categories; consumer discretionary and consumer 
staples comprise 84% of the companies. Not surprisingly, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates 
that the distribution of industries between all-female and all-male pitches is only marginally 
different. 
Insert Figures 1 to 3 here 
Where all-female and all-male teams begin to differ significantly, however, is in terms of 
asking valuations, including both the equity stakes and dollar value of investment. All-female 
teams tend to ask for lower dollar amounts of investment, with higher equity stakes, imputing 
lower company valuations. As shown in Table 2, the average company valuations across all 
teams is approximately $2.2 million; yet, for all-male teams, the average asking valuation is 
closer to $3 million, while all-female team valuations are closer to $1 million. All-female teams 
ask for half the dollar amount than of that all-male teams and are also initially willing to release, 
on average, 2% more equity stake in their company. Despite the significantly lower valuations of 
all-female companies, all-male teams demonstrate lower total sales than all-female teams with 
more than twice the amount of personal capital invested into the companies, although these 
differences are not statistically significant.  
We include several measures of the extensive margin, or yield rates. These include 
measures of the percentage of entrepreneurial pitches that received offers. Yield rates measuring 
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the percentage of pitches that resulted in either at least one offer by the investors, exactly one 
offer, or multiple offers, indicate the following: 63% of all entrepreneurial pitches result in at 
least one offer by the investors. Further, this yield rate does not statistically differ between all-
female and all-male teams. Sixty-four percent of the pitches by all-female teams receive at least 
one offer by the investors, compared to 63% of the all-male teams. About half of the pitches that 
receive offers receive multiple offers. Specifically, 30% of total entrepreneurial pitches result in 
multiple offers. The yield rate for multiple offers is 26% for all-female teams and 30% for all-
male teams. Eleven percent of the total number of teams that pitched rejected all offers they 
received; all-female teams had a 9% reject rate, while all-male teams had a 14% reject rate. Of 
the total number of teams that received at least one offer, 18% of them rejected all offers. 
Furthermore, Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the intensive margin as well, or 
the dollar and equity value offered (and accepted) by investors to entrepreneurs.  On average, 
accepted deals between investors and entrepreneurs include approximately $272,000 for 32% 
equity in each company. The average accepted valuation for all teams is approximately $1.3 
million.7 The majority of companies accept valuations that are lower than what they initially 
present, as indicated by the negative average bid ask spread in Table 2. In order to understand the 
contextual background for these magnitudes taking into consideration the initial asking values, 
we also include final company valuations and bid-ask spreads normalized by the initial company 
valuations. Regardless of the gender composition of the team, on average, all teams that accept 
an offer walk away with around 63% of their initial asking valuation. Out of all these measures, 
only the average equity amount accepted statistically differs between all-female and all-male 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This value does not represent the quotient of the accepted dollar amount and the accepted equity amount. This is 
because the average accepted valuation for each company uses corresponding dollar and equity amounts for each 
company, while average dollar and average equity are calculated within each separate variable.  
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teams. Namely, all-female teams, on average, accept offers giving a larger equity stake in the 
company to the investors, relative to their all-male counterparts. 
Insert Table 2 here 
5 Results 
We use ordinary least-squares (“OLS”) regression analyses to calculate the relationship 
between gender and success in angel financing in this context. Our main dependent variables 
include an indicator variable equal to one if a team received at least one offer from an investor, 
the final company valuation a firm received, and bid ask spread (the difference between the final 
company valuation and initial company valuation).  Additionally, we include several control 
variables that may influence whether investors will invest, and if so how much. These include 
the total number of entrepreneurs on the team, the age of the company, and prior success of the 
firm as measured by their total sales to date. As the final angel investment can be affected by the 
entrepreneur’s initial company valuation, the asking dollar amount and asking equity percentage 
are also included as controls to mirror accuracy in the angel financing process. 
Table 3 indicates the main results of our analysis, looking at the difference in outcomes 
between all-female and all-male teams. Model 1 examines the relationship between the gender 
composition of the team and the likelihood of receiving an offer. This model indicates that the 
likelihood of being funded is not statistically different for all-female versus all-male teams. The 
remaining models examine final company valuation and bid ask spread, respectively. We see in 
model 2 that, on average, all-female teams have a $1.2 million higher final company valuation 
than all-male teams. Similarly, model 3 shows that a positive relationship exists between the 
 
	  
17 
gender composition of the team and the bid ask spread. The average bid ask spread for all-female 
teams is $982,000 larger than for all-male teams due to the increased final company valuation. 
Insert Table 3 here 
However, prior literature indicates that women choose particular industries that tend to be 
less profitable (Loscocco, Robinson, Hall, & Allen, 1991). Women-owned firms concentrate in 
sectors that are highly competitive, such as service and retail (Du Rietz & Henrekson, 2000; 
Fairlie & Robb, 2009). Therefore, opportunities for growth and profitability are limited within 
these industries. Thus, the industry in which an entrepreneur chooses to enter may have a 
substantial impact on the success of obtaining funding for the company, as well as the magnitude 
of funding received. The choice of industry may also determine the impact of the effect of 
having females on a team in regards to securing said funding. Therefore, we explore our prior 
results with the incorporation of interaction effects between the gender composition of a team 
and the industry to isolate the gender impact on the probability of receiving offers. We also 
examine the gender impact, given a certain industry, on final company valuations and bid ask 
spreads. 
Table 4 indicates our prior main results with interaction effects incorporated between the 
gender composition of a team and the industry of the company. Model 1 shows that even when 
taking into consideration gender and industry, all-female teams are no less likely to receive 
offers than all-male teams. However, in model 2, it is evident that when this interaction term is 
taken into account, there is a negative relationship between all-female teams and final company 
valuations. This magnitude increases to a $3 million difference between all-female and all-male 
teams. The magnitude of the interaction effect is $2.2 million and shows the difference in the 
effect of an all-female team versus an all-male team in different industries. Therefore, the direct 
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effect of having an all-female team and the interaction effect with industry show that all-female 
teams, on average, receive final company valuations that are $685,000 lower than all-male 
teams.  
Insert Table 4 here 
Given that all-female teams receive lower final company valuations depending on the 
industry, we continue to examine further possibilities for an explanation. Next, we look into the 
differences in the initial asking dollar amount, asking equity percentage, and initial company 
valuation between all-female and all-male teams. Table 5 shows the relationship between the 
three aforementioned initial financial variables and the gender composition of the team, taking 
into consideration the control variables. Model 1 indicates that an all-female team, on average, 
has an asking dollar amount that is $130,000 less than all-male teams. Model 2 shows that all-
female teams are initially willing to release 2.5% more equity stake in their company, therefore 
lowering average company valuations to $1.4 million below that of all-male teams, as shown in 
model 3.  
We then looked into the marginal effect of adding even one additional female to the 
entrepreneurial team on the initial company valuations. Table 6 indicates these results. Model 1 
shows that, on average, if a female is on the team, the team asks for $110,000 less than all-male 
teams. The initial equity percentage the team is willing to release is 1.2% greater than all-male 
teams, and initial company valuations are $1.2 million lower than for all-male teams, as shown in 
models 2 and 3. Our results indicate that as long as one female is present on the team, the team 
initially asks for significantly less than all-male teams. 
Insert Tables 5 and 6 here 
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Therefore, the issue lies in the internal initial company valuations for women-owned 
versus men-owned firms. We are unable to sufficiently assess whether all-male teams, on 
average, initially value their companies close to fair market value solely based on the 
information provided in the pitch. Such valuations would require complete analyses of the 
different market segments, environments, industries and competitors in the space. However, all-
female teams still value their companies at significant discounts relative to their male 
counterparts, holding all else except for gender constant. The lower self-valuations are the main 
reason for why all-female teams secure less angel financing than all-male teams. They are no less 
likely than male teams to receive an offer from an angel investor; however, they receive lower 
company valuations in the end because they ask for less initially. 
6 External Validity and Robustness 
There are several critical factors to consider when understanding the robustness of our 
results. The most pressing issues here include considering selection bias, determining if the 
environment is representative of the U.S. entrepreneurship landscape, and valuing companies 
when investors present final offers that have components outside of only dollar and equity stakes 
(“alternative company valuations”). 
Selection bias 
 Selection bias may be a problem because there is a possibility that certain companies 
have higher probabilities of selection for participation on the show for reasons such as the 
entertainment value of a pitch. Therefore, if pitches are selected based on the entertainment value 
they provide, this can impact two important statistics in our population – gender composition of 
the entrepreneurial sample and success rates of financing. 
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First, we look into the correlation between entertainment value and the gender 
composition of a team. If it were the case that females were correlated with lower entertainment 
value, fewer females would successfully pass through the selection process. However, 40% of 
entrepreneurial teams had at least one female, including all-female and mixed teams. This 
percentage is substantial enough to disprove the hypothesis that female entrepreneurs are 
correlated with low entertainment values. Next, if female teams are associated with high 
entertainment values, we should see the population of female entrepreneurs larger than that of 
males, and much higher than where it currently stands at slightly below half the population. The 
entrepreneurial breakdown on the show works to prove that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between the entertainment value of a pitch and the gender of entrepreneurs. 
Therefore, the selection process for the show withstands these selection bias stress tests. 
Second, we examine whether the entertainment value of a pitch and success in angel 
financing are correlated. If we hold true the assumptions that each company pitch is chosen 
based on entertainment value and those with higher entertainment value are more successful, we 
would witness success rates closer to that of 100%. However, the rate of receiving at least one 
offer from the investors is only 63%. This disproves that the entertainment value of a pitch is tied 
to, or predicts, the company’s success with respect to securing funding. Consequently, we can 
consider the success rates to not be skewed based on the entertainment value factor. 
After examining all cases of selection bias on the show with respect to entertainment 
values of pitches, we are confident that substantial bias in the selection process does not exist. 
Further, any selection bias that may be inherently present does not negatively skew our results 
concluded from data analysis of our sample. 
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Representative environment of entrepreneurship in U.S. 
Additionally, we examine whether the sample of entrepreneurs on Shark Tank is 
reflective of the actual population of entrepreneurs in the U.S. We do this in two ways. First, we 
look into the sample of entrepreneurs on the firm-level. We consider the demographic 
breakdown looking into all-female and mixed teams. Together, 40% of teams in the sample have 
at least one female entrepreneur; 26% of teams contain only females, and 14% are mixed. Out of 
the mixed teams, 6% were over 50% female and the rest were two-person teams of one male and 
one female. If an entrepreneur’s percentage ownership is proportional to the percentage of 
presence they hold on the team, a women-owned team with regard to mixed teams in the sample, 
is one where there are two or more females present on the team. Thus, all-female teams and 
mixed teams with two or more females constitute 27% of all teams. However, based on the 
ownership distribution between partners on the team, mixed teams with one female and one male 
may also be considered women-owned. Therefore, when we consider all of the mixed and all-
female teams, the percentage increases to 40% of the sample. As a comparison, in the U.S. in 
2012, 36% of all businesses were women-owned (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). Thus, regardless 
of how we consider mixed teams, the representative proportion of women-owned firms in the 
sample is close to the one in the U.S, as both 27% and 40% are near 36%, and all are well below 
the majority. 
Second, we examine whether the sample of entrepreneurs is reflective of that in the U.S. 
on the entrepreneur-level. Thirty-five percent of all of the entrepreneurs in the sample were 
female – there were 255 females out of 734 entrepreneurs. In 2014, 37% of new entrepreneurs in 
the U.S. were female (Fairlie, Morelix, Reedy, & Russell, 2015). Thus, the percent of female 
entrepreneurs in our sample is directly in line with that in the U.S. Therefore, given our analysis 
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of the entrepreneurial sample both on the firm-level and the entrepreneur-level, we conclude this 
sample is representative of the larger entrepreneurial population in the U.S. 
Alternative Company Valuations 
In the main analysis, we chose to exclude from our financial analyses certain teams 
whose final company valuations consisted of clauses outside of only dollar and equity amounts. 
The investors have the opportunity to present entrepreneurs with offers that contain royalty 
contingencies; around 10% of teams received such an offer. As this is a small percentage of the 
total population, these teams were removed from financial metric analyses such as the final 
company valuations and bid ask spreads. The teams are still included in calculations for all other 
variables that did not consider final company valuations. This is due to the subjective nature of 
how angel investors value dollar and royalty amounts in response to a final company valuation. 
Royalties are typically valued using the present value of the notional royalty stream that 
ownership relieves the business from paying. The capital value of the asset is then calculated 
using either a discounted cash flow or multiple to arrive at the current value of the forecast 
notional royalty stream (Liberman, Chrocziel, & Levine, 2011). As proper discount rates and 
multiples for each company cannot be determined given the provided information, we cannot 
accurately forecast future sales in order to arrive at the fair company valuation. However, such 
royalty offers are beneficial for both the angel investors and entrepreneurs. They leave 
entrepreneurs with more equity due to the risk mitigation for the lender in comparison to a 
traditional equity investment in the company. If the business and sales grow rapidly, the angel’s 
royalty payments will allow for an earlier return on investment, as opposed to stock in the 
company. Thus, the angel will be willing to accept a smaller equity stake in return for the royalty 
stream. Royalty-structured offers further prevent dilution of business ownership, while returning 
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the upfront capital needed to jumpstart the business. Therefore, exclusion of this cohort of 
pitches does not significantly affect our results. 
7 Discussion and Conclusions 
 This paper investigates the relationship between success rates in angel financing and the 
gender of entrepreneurs in a sample environment covering nearly 500 U.S. entrepreneurial 
teams. Our results show that no bias exists in the likelihood of receiving such funding between 
female and male entrepreneurs. Rather, we find the disparities lie in the magnitude of final 
capital received, as women-owned firms receive less funding from angel investors than their 
male counterparts. Women-owned firms, depending on industry, receive company valuations 
that are $685,000 less than those of all-male firms. These differences remain statistically 
significant even if only one female is present on the team, controlling for numerous firm and 
entrepreneurial characteristics we believe may impact the company valuations. However, these 
differences are due to the fact that women-owned firms ask for less and value their own 
companies at significantly lower levels than all-male firms. 
Further research should examine more closely the panel of angel investors present for 
each pitch. Entrepreneurs can establish commonalities with the angel investors, such as ones 
based on gender, familial and educational backgrounds, or interests. Such commonalities lead to 
homophily, the sociological principle that contact between similar people occurs at higher rates 
than among dissimilar people (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). These established 
commonalities may also affect financing because the investors may be more likely to fund 
certain entrepreneurs over others. Namely, is it more likely female entrepreneurs receive angel 
funding from female investors? The commonalities between entrepreneurs and investors can 
impact company valuations, depending on the importance they hold for angel investors. Thus, 
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further research can benefit from examining the rates of commonalities for all-male teams versus 
all-female teams and the impact on the likelihood of receiving offers, the magnitude of final 
company valuations and bid ask spreads. As our dataset allows for such analyses to be 
performed, it is our intent to continue to investigate more possibilities that can work to explain 
the disparities in angel financing for firms. Further analyses will take into account other 
commonalities outside of gender, such as similar familial backgrounds or interests, to see how 
they impact the likelihood of angel funding. 
Our results provide insights for entrepreneurs and policy makers for overcoming the 
funding differences between male- and female-led companies. Prior to seeking angel financing, it 
is crucial for entrepreneurs to understand how to establish fair company valuations given current 
market conditions and other firms in the space. Our findings help inform female entrepreneurs 
about the significant differences in initial company valuations between all-female and all-male 
teams. Further, our results stress the importance of providing proper company valuations in order 
to better access the vital funding needed for women-owned ventures in the early stages. 
However, it may be the case that the differences in initial company valuations occur because they 
reached a partial equilibrium result. Perhaps, women are asking for less because in this 
equilibrium, they understand they will not receive funding if they ask for more initially. 
Nevertheless, this is also where government policy can be of large assistance.  
For policy makers, the results suggest that providing incentives, such as government tax 
considerations, to angel investors who fund new female-owned entrepreneurial ventures may be 
an impactful way of minimizing the gender financing gap. One such government program 
already in existence is the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, which 
encourages domestic small businesses to engage in federal research and development (SBIR, 
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2016). However, SBIR only focuses on small firms in the technology sector. A similar program 
and idea structure can be taken and applied to private investors that fund new women-owned 
businesses in numerous industries, and industries outside of where women tend to cluster. 
Instead of awarding private investors grants, they can receive tax reliefs that may be tied to either 
the magnitude of the funding they provide for female-owned ventures or the number 
(percentage) of female-owned ventures they fund. Regardless, various policies can be put into 
effect that would encourage angel investors to fund more women-owned businesses with larger 
capital amounts, given that all-female teams come with valuations closer to that of all-male 
teams. The increase in available funding for women-owned ventures in numerous market sectors 
can encourage more females to start companies and enter industries that were previously male-
dominated.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Details on the television show selection process  
There are two main ways to apply to be on the show: through an email submission or an 
open call. The first, an email submission, requires that the entrepreneur email their name, age, 
contact information, a recent photo of themselves and a brief non-confidential description of 
their business, product or idea to a general casting email. The second option is to attend an open 
call audition. These auditions are held on numerous dates every season across the U.S. During 
the open call, entrepreneurs are given the opportunity to do a 1-minute pitch of their 
business/product/idea to a member of the casting team. However, the entrepreneurs must have 
the application packet completed prior to their arrival. The application packet consists of 
extensive paper work that detail their business/product/idea and financials. All open calls are 
open to the general public, as long as the entrepreneurs arrive during the allotted two-hour time-
slot when numbered wristbands are distributed (ABC, 2016). Only the applicants with numbered 
wristbands are guaranteed to have a chance to pitch, or approximately the first 500 applicants. 
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Figures  
 
Figure 1. Industry Distribution for All Teams 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Industry Distribution for All-Female Teams 
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Figure 3. Industry Distribution for All-Male Teams 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. U.S. non-farm firms by gender ownership, 1997 to 2012 
   
All firmsa 
(number) 
 All U.S. firms 
   2012b 
  
27,626,360 
 2007c 
  
27,092,908 
 2002d 
  
22,974,655 
 1997e 
  
20,821,934 
  Growth 1997-2012 (%) 
 
32.7 
 
     Women-owned firms 
   2012 
  
9,878,397 
 2007 
  
7,792,115 
 2002 
  
6,489,259 
 1997 
  
5,417,034 
  Growth 1997-2012 (%) 
 
82.4 
  
a. Number of firms with or without paid employees 
b. 2012 Survey of Business Owners 
c. 2007 Survey of Business Owners 
d. 2002 Survey of Business Owners, Women-owned firms 
e. 1997 Survey of Women-Owned Business Enterprises 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of sample of entrepreneurial pitches    
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
  
All  
teams 
All-female 
teams  
All-male 
teams 
 
     Number of pitches 495 128 296 
 Number of offers  515 129 308 
 Maximum number of offers  5 5 4 
 
     Dependent Variables 
    Extensive margin 
    Yield rates** 
    At least one offer 63% 64% 63% 
 One offer only 33% 38% 32% 
 Multiple offers 30% 26% 30% 
 Accepted offer 51% 55% 49% 
 Rejected offer 11% 9% 14% 
 
     Intensive margin 
    Average dollar amount accepted  $272,545 $197,232 $318,000 
 Average equity amount accepted 32% 37% 31% *** 
Average accepted company valuation $1,250,153 $827,454 $1,450,838 
 Average accepted company valuation  
(normalized) 0.64 0.63 0.63 
 Average bid-ask spread -$812,071.60 -$581,070.60 -$961,297.80 
 Average bid-ask spread (normalized)  -0.36 -0.37 -0.37 
 
     Control Variables 
    Industry composition**** 
    Consumer discretionary 239 68 136 
 Consumer staples  146 43 78 
 Energy  1 0 1 
 Financial services 3 0 3 
 Health Care 6 2 4 
 Industrials 16 3 13 
 Information Technology 8 0 8 
 Materials 2 0 0 
 Telecommunication Services 3 2 1 
 Utilities  4 1 3 
 Asking dollar amount $259,855 $159,906 $320,253 *** 
Asking equity amount 18% 19% 17% *** 
Asking company valuation $2,166,046 $1,323,934 $2,655,928 *** 
Average team size 1.48 1.38 1.37 
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Total sales $782,514 $894,291 $703,097 
 Production cost per unit $148 $16 $264 
 Price per unit $443 $71 $773 
 Company age (years) 2.34 2.18 2.13 
 Personal capital invested $292,921 $159,668 $407,906 
 
     
* Note: Column 1 includes descriptive statistics for all teams, including all male, all female, and 
teams with mixed-composition of male and female. All-female teams (column 2) are those 
entrepreneurial teams with only female members, similarly for all-male teams (column 3). 
Normalized values are calculated by dividing by initial company valuation. Average accepted 
company valuation is not the product of average dollar amount and equity. This is because the 
valuation for each company uses corresponding dollar and equity amounts for each company, 
while average dollar and average equity are calculated within each separate variable.    
 
** Yield rates are calculated based on the total number of entrepreneurial pitches in that category. 
For instance, yield rates for column 1 consider the number of offers of each type divided by the 
total number of pitches by all teams (all-female, all-male and mixed). Yield rates in column 2 
indicate the total number of offers of each type divided by the number of all-female teams. 
 
*** indicates the t-test of means between all-female and all-male entrepreneurial teams is 
significantly different at the 5% level. 
 
**** We categorize industries using the Global Industry Classification System (GICS). 
Consumer discretionary includes automobiles, consumer durables and apparel, consumer 
services, media, retail. Consumer staples include food and beverage, tobacco, household and 
personal products. Financial services include banks, insurance and real estate. Health care 
includes healthcare equipment and services, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology. Industrials 
include capital goods, commercial and professional services, and transportation. Information 
technology includes software and software-related services, technology hardware and equipment, 
and semiconductors and semiconductor equipment. 
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Table 3. The relationship between all-female teams and success measure outcomes for angel 
financing 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Offer Final Company Valuation Bid-Ask Spread 
    Female Team 0.002 1,193,898.585* 982,047.761* 
 
[0.070] [656,184.973] [549,406.584] 
Total # Entrepreneurs 0.075 871,238.155* 877,692.814** 
 
[0.055] [485,141.827] [406,196.614] 
Industry -0.006 21,131.615 53,566.799 
 
[0.005] [50,526.375] [42,304.418] 
Company Age -0.015 -40,367.767 28,159.429 
 
[0.017] [164,049.402] [137,354.291] 
Total Sales To Date -0.000 -0.178* -0.162* 
 
[0.000] [0.100] [0.084] 
Asking Dollar Amount -0.000 6.932*** -2.612*** 
 
[0.000] [0.764] [0.640] 
Asking Equity Percentage -0.009** -83,039.527** 27,439.474 
 
[0.003] [38,285.690] [32,055.611] 
Constant 0.772*** -375,116.502 -2,287,769.359** 
 
[0.121] [1,253,911.562] [1,049,867.487] 
Observations 215 106 106 
Adjusted R-squared 0.034 0.483 0.267 
Standard errors in brackets 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
    
 
 
*Note: Model (1) dependent variable is binary; “Offer” is equal to one for teams that received at 
least one offer and equal to zero for teams that received no offers. 
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Table 4. The relationship between all-female teams and success measure outcomes for angel 
financing taking into consideration interaction effects 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Offer 
Final Company 
Valuation Bid-Ask Spread 
    Female Team 0.063 -2,914,479.838*** -2,435,249.571*** 
 
[0.083] [672,978.451] [566,461.443] 
Female Team * Industry -0.024 2,229,307.430*** 1,854,309.791*** 
 
[0.018] [250,617.809] [210,950.775] 
Total # Entrepreneurs 0.076 576,279.716 632,350.107** 
 
[0.055] [363,401.110] [305,883.074] 
Industry -0.004 -22,902.562 16,939.726 
 
[0.006] [38,013.188] [31,996.574] 
Company Age -0.014 22,992.250 80,861.492 
 
[0.017] [122,577.608] [103,176.392] 
Total Sales to Date -0.000 -0.099 -0.096 
 
[0.000] [0.075] [0.063] 
Asking Dollar Amount -0.000 6.574*** -2.910*** 
 
[0.000] [0.571] [0.481] 
Asking Equity Percentage -0.009** -72,957.682** 35,825.426 
 
[0.003] [28,581.185] [24,057.441] 
Constant 0.763*** 52,297.022 -1,932,252.183** 
 
[0.120] [936,572.098] [788,334.279] 
Observations 215 106 106 
Adjusted R-squared 0.038 0.712 0.588 
Standard errors in brackets 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
 
 
*Note: Model (1) dependent variable is binary; “Offer” is equal to one for teams that received at 
least one offer and equal to zero for teams that received no offers. 
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Table 5. The relationship between all-female teams and initial asking valuations 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Asking Dollar Asking Equity Initial Company Valuation 
    Female Team -130,058.317** 2.481* -1,378,930.863** 
 
[54,727.889] [1.380] [632,373.268] 
Total # Entrepreneurs -25,096.261 -1.270 43,016.386 
 
[43,174.998] [1.088] [498,881.194] 
Industry 8,830.526** -0.163 77,457.417 
 
[4,178.701] [0.105] [48,284.317] 
Company Age -14,073.948 1.557*** -275,095.705* 
 
[12,713.271] [0.321] [146,900.110] 
Total Sales To Date 0.050*** -0.000*** 0.514*** 
 
[0.009] [0.000] [0.106] 
Constant 285,471.509*** 15.521*** 2,643,320.904*** 
 
[82,151.800] [2.071] [949,252.801] 
    Observations 215 215 215 
Adjusted R-squared 0.148 0.139 0.113 
Standard errors in brackets 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 
 
*Note: Model (1) dependent variable is binary; “Offer” is equal to one for teams that received at 
least one offer and equal to zero for teams that received no offers. 
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Table 6. The relationship between female (all-female and mixed) teams and initial asking 
valuations 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Asking Dollar Asking Equity Initial Company Valuation 
    Female and Mixed Teams -110,159.361** 1.156 -1,195,554.617** 
 
[45,352.212] [1.204] [527,968.661] 
Total # Entrepreneurs -13,174.891 -2.233** 177,572.961 
 
[37,820.240] [1.004] [440,285.061] 
Industry 8,870.502** -0.224** 81,903.869* 
 
[3,638.649] [0.097] [42,359.405] 
Company Age -10,152.255 1.119*** -213,509.631* 
 
[9,879.829] [0.262] [115,016.224] 
Total Sales To Date 0.049*** -0.000*** 0.529*** 
 
[0.008] [0.000] [0.095] 
Constant 261,014.119*** 18.035*** 2,296,606.605*** 
 
[68,961.272] [1.831] [802,814.003] 
    Observations 254 254 254 
Adjusted R-squared 0.154 0.109 0.126 
Standard errors in brackets 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 
 
*Note: Model (1) dependent variable is binary; “Offer” is equal to one for teams that received at 
least one offer and equal to zero for teams that received no offers. 
 
